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Abstract 
This paper assesses the growth prospects for the Turkish economy over the next decade. It implicitly ask 
whether Turkey can start closing the gap with the EU in terms of income per capita once it has achieved 
macroeconomic stability and negotiations with the EU provide an anchor for overall economic policy-
making. Viewed from this perspective, the outlook is promising. Turkey is still very poor, compared to 
most of the existing EU members, but is also more dynamic. The fact that most of the so-called 
‘periphery’ is now growing more strongly than the ‘core’ confirms that within an enlarged EU the poorer 
member countries are likely to prosper and thus cause fewer problems than widely anticipated. 
The analysis starts by relating the record of Turkey over the last years, which is a story of ‘ups’ and 
‘downs’, with most recently a very strong ‘up’. This is then followed by a comparison of two different 
metrics: GDP per capita and per worker, which leads us to the issue of demographic trends, which 
differentiate Turkey from both old and new member states. Some of the structural and regional 
peculiarities of the Turkish economy are next examined, followed by an evaluation of the factors that 
should determine growth in the longer run. Finally, two upbeat growth scenarios are drawn. 
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Kemal Derviş, Daniel Gros, Faik Öztrak, Fırat Bayar 
and Yusuf Işık 
Introduction 
Health not wealth should be the decisive criterion when evaluating Turkey's prospects to become a 
member of the EU. Viewed from this perspective, the outlook appears promising. Turkey is still very 
poor, compared to most existing EU members, but it is also more dynamic. Full catch-up in terms of 
GDP per capita might take more than a generation, rather than years, but full catch-up is not the 
relevant criterion if one is concerned about enlargement. Experience in the EU has shown that 
problems are much more likely to arise from established rich member countries with stagnant 
economies (Belgium in the 1980s, Italy and Germany today) than from poor, but more dynamic states 
(e.g. Portugal and Greece today). The fact that most of the so-called ‘periphery’ is now growing more 
strongly than the ‘core’ confirms that within an enlarged EU the poorer member countries are likely to 
prosper and thus cause fewer problems than widely anticipated. 
Assessing the growth prospects of the Turkish economy is also important for creating a positive 
background for the membership negotiations that might last for quite some time. If Turkey can narrow 
the gap in terms of GDP per capita over the next decade, the perception that the EU is about to take 
‘yet another poor country’ will be weakened. 
What would be the benchmark? As shown below, Turkey’s real income is at about the same level of 
that of Bulgaria and Romania today. These two countries seem now to have embarked on a slow, but 
steady convergence path with growth rates in the 4-5% range. Given that Turkey’s population is still 
growing at a bit more than 1% p.a., and that the population of Bulgaria and Romania is shrinking, this 
implies that Turkey will have to grow by more than 6% on a sustained basis just in order not to fall 
behind the two lagging members of the EU-27. The negotiation position of Turkey would be 
immensely strengthened if by the end of this decade it was the most dynamic economy in Europe. 
In this part we assess the growth prospects for the Turkish economy over the next decade. We 
implicitly ask whether Turkey can start closing the gap with the EU in terms of income per capita once 
it has achieved macroeconomic stability and negotiations with the EU provide an anchor for overall 
economic policy-making. We start by relating the record of Turkey over the last years, which is a story 
of up and downs, with most recently a very strong up. This is then followed by a comparison in 
Section 2 of two different metrics: GDP per capita and per worker, which leads us to the issue of the 
demographic trends, which differentiate Turkey from both old and new member states. 
In Section 3 we turn to some of the structural and regional peculiarities of the Turkish economy. In 
Section 4 we then turn to an evaluation of the factors that should determine growth in the longer run. 
Section 5 then presents two upbeat growth scenarios and the final section concludes. 
1.  What is the starting point for Turkey? 
There is a widespread, but erroneous perception in E u r o p e  t h a t  T u r k e y  i s  b y  a  w i d e  m a r g i n  t h e  
‘poorest’ of the countries that are in or will be joining the European Union. This perception does not 
fully reflect the facts. 2 | DERVIŞ, GROS, ÖZTRAK, BAYAR & IŞIK 
 
At the same time it remains actually difficult to determine the starting point for Turkey because the 
situation has been changing so rapidly. Figure 1 shows that this has been a feature of the Turkish 
economy over the last decade. It has not been uncommon to see GDP falling by 8% one year, only to 
rebound the next year by a similar amount. No EU member country has a similar record. The 
experience of Poland and Portugal, which both underwent deep structural change, seems positively 
stable when viewed against that of Turkey. 
Figure 1. The growth record over the last decade 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
With this volatile growth record, it is not surprising that the lesson one draws from any snapshot of the 
Turkish economy depends crucially on the particular year one is looking at. Table 1 below presents 
data and comparisons that are relevant in this context, looking at both nominal and purchasing power 
adjusted estimates. 
Table 1. Turkey’s relative income position in per capita GDP 
 PPP  (€)  Nominal  (€) 
  2003  Average (1998-2003)  2003  Average (1998-2003) 
EU-15 €23,270  €21,700  €24,320  €22,677 
New EU-10  €11,300  €10,675  €7,854  €6,722 
Poland €9,860  €9,043  €4,850  €4,687 
Bulgaria €6,280  €5,503  €2,260  €1,807 
Romania €6,350  €5,582  €2,320  €1,966 
Turkey €5,750  €5,662  €3,000  €2,805 
 PPP  (EU=100)  Nominal  (EU=100) 
  2003  Average (1998-2003)  2003  Average (1998-2003) 
EU-15 100  100  100  100 
New EU-10  48.6  47.2  32.3  29.5 
Poland 42.4  41.6  19.9  20.6 
Bulgaria 27.0  25.3  9.3  7.9 
Romania 27.3  25.1 9.5  8.5 
Turkey 24.7  26.2  12.3  12.4 
Sources: EUROSTAT, New Cronos. 
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The estimates in Table 1 show that in 2003 Turkey’s nominal per capita income is at 12% of the 2003 
EU-15 average and at 25% of PPP adjusted per capita income of the EU-15. In nominal per capita 
terms, Turkey is only at 38% and in PPP adjusted per capita terms just above one-half the level of the 
10 new accession countries. 
Turning to individual comparisons and including Romania and Bulgaria, which are scheduled for 
accession in 2007, Turkey’s nominal per capita income in 2003 was about 62% that of Poland but was 
actually 29% higher than Romania’s and 33% higher than Bulgaria’s.  
These comparisons refer to one particular year and the new member countries at the time of (or only 
two years before) their accession, while we are looking at Turkey about a decade before accession. If 
the Turkish economy continues its current impressive growth rate, the numbers could change quite 
rapidly. It is also worth noting that GDP growth in 2004 is expected to be 6%. Moreover, one could 
argue that a fairer comparison would be to take the accession countries’ GDP at the time they started 
negotiations and compare those figures to Turkey’s likely GDP in 2005, the year in which it is 
expected to start negotiations.  
Polish GDP in 1995, for example, stood at about 35% of the EU average in PPP terms
1 and that of 
Bulgaria and Romania was much lower. Turkey might not be far from these values when its turn 
comes around. 
It is quite clear, therefore, that the distance that separates Turkish GDP per capita and living standards 
from those in the EU before the 2004 accession of the 10 new countries, is not larger than the distance 
these countries faced at the time they started their negotiations.  
Moreover, in comparison to Romania and Bulgaria, which are scheduled to join the EU in 2007, 
Turkey is within 10% of their level in terms of PPP adjusted income estimates and actually much 
higher at nominal income estimates.  
An interesting feature of Table 1 is that the ratios of PPP adjusted GDP to GDP at current exchange 
rates are much smaller when Turkey is compared to the 10 new members than when compared to 
Romania and Bulgaria. In the latter case, Turkey looks significantly richer at nominal exchange rates 
of 2003 than it does in terms of PPP estimates. The discrepancy is surprising, particularly as the share 
of non-tradables in GDP is larger in Turkey than in Bulgaria and Romania. This, ceteris paribus, 
should lead to more rather than less of a difference between nominal and PPP-adjusted income in 
Turkey compared to Romania and Bulgaria. Given that this problem does not arise when comparing 
the Turkish numbers with those of the 10 new members, it must have something to do with the PPP 
conversions for Romania and Bulgaria. It may reflect an undervaluation of their nominal exchange 
rate.  
2.  GDP per capita or GDP per worker? 
The per capita income data described above must, of course, reflect underlying productivity figures. 
Higher income levels are reached by higher productivity of labour. The relationship is not a simple 
direct one, however. For a given average level of productivity per person employed, per capita income 
will vary with the ratio of total employment to total population. That employment ratio, in turn, will 
depend on the demographic characteristics of a country, and notably the share of the 15 to 64 age 
bracket that is the population that could potentially be employed as well as the population actually 
employed within that age bracket. 
Therefore, per capita income figures reflect, both the level a country has reached in terms of labour 
productivity, which measures the degree of development of the country, and the long- as well as short-
term determinants of total employment. The low per capita figures of Turkey are thus partially a 
reflection of a low rate of labour market participation of the population. 
                                                 
1 Assuming 6% annual growth in 2004 and 2005 in US dollar terms, which is somewhat less than projected in 
the IMF-supported Economic Programme, which projects a slightly more appreciated Turkish lira (TL). 4 | DERVIŞ, GROS, ÖZTRAK, BAYAR & IŞIK 
 
Table 2 below presents the basic age structure and employment ratios in Turkey and selected 
accession countries. The figures are not directly comparable to the national income accounts as 
sources but they illustrate the fact that Turkey is still in an early stage of its demographic transition, 
with the ratio of total employment to total population substantially below that in the comparator 
countries, largely because of a lower ratio of the 15 to 64 age group as well as a lower participation 
rate. 
Table 2. Employment, 15-64 age group and total employment/population 15-64 (2002) 
  Employment 
(000’s) 
15-64 Age 
group/total pop 
Total emp./ 15-64 
age group 
Total emp./total 
pop** 
Bulgaria  2998 0.68 0.55 0.37 
Czech  Rep.  4760 0.70 0.67 0.46 
Hungary  3855 0.68 0.55 0.37 
Poland  13782  0.67 0.52 0.35 
Romania  7745 0.68 0.52 0.35 
Turkey*  20836  0.64 0.44 0.28 
* Year 2000. 
** Product of columns 2 and 3. 
Sources: Calculated from EUROSTAT, Statistical Yearbook and Turkish State Institute of Statistics (SIS). 
 
Table 2 describes how Turkey’s total employment ratio is still well below that of the comparator 
countries, because of its demographic structure and because of a lower participation rate and actual 
employment in the 15-64 age group. Similar differences in labour force participation rates also exist 
among the EU-15, with generally the highest value to be found among the Scandinavian countries. 
Turkey would find itself at the lower end of the ‘Southern’ group within the EU. Part of the lower 
employment ratio of the population in working age in Turkey stems from the very low labour market 
participation rates of women. As discussed below, this could also be regarded as a potential growth 
factor. 
Turkey is in the midst of a demographic transition, reflecting a fairly rapid decline of the population 
growth rate, from the 2.5 to 3% range in the 1950s and 1960s, to close to the 1.4% neighbourhood, at 
the beginning of the new century. This implies a rising proportion of the 15 to 64 age group in the total 
population, starting from a low base, as fewer new babies are born to fill the below-15 age group, and 
as life expectation, while lengthening, is not yet long enough to result in a large proportion of the total 
population above age 64. 
Figure 2 below shows the demographic bonus in the form of a large hump-shaped curve, which puts 
Turkey well above all current and prospective member countries, whose demographic ‘transition’ 
occurred a generation earlier. Thus the Spanish and Portuguese curves are below that of Turkey and 
anticipate its movements by about 20 years. (Poland is a special case because of the horrendous losses 
the country suffered during World War II. This implies that for each year until 2015 there will be 
fewer pensioners falling out of the labour force. After 2015, however, the low birth rates will make 
themselves felt in a rapidly deteriorating demographic situation.) Turkey has thus had a demographic 
bonus over the last decades, but it seems that this bonus has not been used so far in the sense that over 
these decades Turkey has failed to converge in terms of GDP per capita. The population in working 
age has grown rapidly, but employment has not, leading to the low employment ratios documented 
above. The ongoing rebound from the 2001 crises has not yet changed this pattern in that employment 
has barely grown since the trough of the crisis. This is a pattern that needs to be broken if Turkey is to 
use its demographic bonus. RELATIVE INCOME GROWTH AND CONVERGENCE | 5  
 
Figure 2. Demographic bonus: Change in labour force/total population -25,65+ 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat and US Census Bureau. 
In considering the official data on employment rates one has also to take into account the fact that in 
Turkey only about one-half of all those officially classified as employed have a ‘standard’ dependent 
job (i.e. receive salaries or daily wages). The other half are either self-employed (mainly in 
agriculture) or are classified as ‘unpaid family workers’.
2  This implies that effectively only around 
20-25% of the population is occupied by the modern part of the Turkish economy. This gives another 
indication of the size of the challenge for economic policy and, at the same time, the opportunity for 
growth. The challenge is to prepare the conditions under which employment in the modern economy 
can double (even apart from any labour force growth). The opportunity comes from the fact that 
productivity in the modern part is so much higher than in the rest of the economy (the 
rural/agricultural sector). If this massive shift towards the modern sector takes place, it could lead to 
almost a doubling of output. A shift of this magnitude will take a generation to materialise, but even 
over such a time horizon this would be quite a boost to growth as it would be in addition to other 
sources of higher productivity. 
It is difficult make an international comparison in this respect since the category ‘unpaid family 
worker’ does not exist in other countries. However, in terms of the share of self-employed it appears 
that the situation in Turkey is comparable to that of Poland, but quite different from that of the EU-15, 
where typically about 85% of the workforce has a standard dependent job. In reality, only Romania 
might be close to the situation of Turkey because the 40% of ‘self employed’ in Romania are likely to 
include those who are classified as ‘unpaid family workers’ in Turkey (where they account for over 
22% of total employment). 
Table 3. Self-employed as % of total employment, 2002   
EU-25 15.5% 
EU-15 14.6% 
Poland 28.1% 
Romania 40.2% 
Turkey 27.6% 
 
                                                 
2 2003 Annual Report of the Central Bank of Turkey, p. 28. 
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3.  Sectoral and Regional Analysis 
Aggregate figures provide important information on national averages. It is useful to complement 
these figures by both sectoral and regional information to give the fullest possible overview of 
Turkey’s relative income position. A large and poor agricultural sector, for example, is perceived by 
some in the EU as a potential problem at the time of membership. If regional disparities are much 
larger in Turkey than in other countries, these could make the accession and post-accession period 
more difficult. 
Table 4 shows that Turkish labour productivity (measured by value added per employee) is close to 
that of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, the three biggest countries among the new EU 
members. This is so despite the fact that gross value added per person employed in agriculture lowers 
the Turkish average (with the exception of Poland in this case). Productivity in services, construction 
and, even more so in industry, is high in Turkey, when compared to the new member countries, 
reflecting the degree of modernity and sophistication reached by Turkey’s ‘modern sector’. The 
situation looks even more favourable to Turkish industry when productivity levels are compared to 
Romania and Bulgaria, the two remaining candidate countries other than Turkey. These productivity 
comparisons show that the Turkish economy is not only ‘more developed’ in terms of productivity 
than the economies of Romania and Bulgaria, but that Turkish productivity outside agriculture is close 
to or higher than what we observe in the new member countries. Moreover, as we discuss in the 
section on convergence prospects below, the demographic trend just referred to will in itself tend to 
narrow the gap between Turkey’s average productivity and average per capita income, and be a source 
of more rapid per capita income growth.  
Table 4. Sectoral gross value added per person employed, 2000 (current euros) 
  Agriculture Industry  Construction  Services Total 
Bulgaria €4,289 €3,696  €3,176  €4,292  €4,073 
Czech Rep.  €9,707  €12,391 €8,867  €12,060 €11,739 
Hungary €7,629 €11,962  €8,566  €12,090  €11,531 
Poland €2,093  €11,841  €12,049 €13,511  €10,874 
Romania €1,149 €5,779  €6,224  €7,466  €4,188 
Turkey €4,577  €13,523  €8,508  €15,657  €10,890 
Source: EUROSTAT. 
It is not productivity levels or even sectoral differences in productivity levels, but regional disparities 
that pose a bigger challenge. Table 5 below illustrates the share of the richest and poorest Level 2 
regions
3 in total GDP in three new members (Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary) and three 
candidate countries (Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey). As the figures indicate, regional disparities are 
large in all of the selected countries.  
Turkey, which is the poorest Level 2 region, registers GDP at less than one-fourth that of the richest 
Level 2 region. Regional disparities in Turkey are somewhat higher than those of the recent or soon to 
be member countries, reflecting in part the larger geographical size of the country. It is interesting to 
note that what differentiates Turkey from the other larger new member countries is not the position of 
the richest region (which is about 50% above the national average), but that of the poorest region.   
                                                 
3 Level 2 of the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) was established by EUROSTAT to 
provide a uniform, consistent breakdown of territorial units for the production of regional statistics for the EU 
(EUROSTAT, 2003) RELATIVE INCOME GROWTH AND CONVERGENCE | 7  
 
Table 5. Regional gross domestic product, 2001 (Level 2 regions, selected countries) 
  Index  GDP per capita (PPP) 
Czech Republic  100  €14,156 
Richest Level 2 Region  224  €31,639 
Poorest Level 2 Region  79  €11,186 
Poland  68  €9,644 
Richest Level 2 Region  106  €15,033 
Poorest Level 2 Region  48  €6,758 
Hungary  85  €12,017 
Richest Level 2 Region  134  €18,993 
Poorest Level 2 Region  56  €7,876 
Romania  40  €5,700 
Richest Level 2 Region  85  €12,042 
Poorest Level 2 Region  29  €4,088 
Bulgaria  43  €6,078 
Richest Level 2 Region  60  €8,483 
Poorest Level 2 Region  36  €5,071 
Turkey  40*  €5,700* 
Richest Level 2 Region  60*  €8,510** 
Poorest Level 2 Region  13*  €1,891** 
* Year 2000. 
** Own calculations from Level 2 GDP and N from the Turkish State Institute of Statistics (SIS). 
Sources: EUROSTAT and the Turkish State Institute of Statistics (SIS). 
4. Growth  Prospects 
Looking at the ‘snapshot’ of 2003 deals with only one aspect of the relative income debate. What is 
even more important is to discuss prospects for long-term convergence between Europe and Turkey in 
terms of income and living standards. 
Any estimate of the longer-term growth and hence convergence prospects of Turkey is torn between a 
disappointing record over the last decade and future prospects that look favourable under a scenario 
with structural reforms and macroeconomic stability. 
While Turkey’s performance was reasonably good until the late 1980s, the record of Turkey over the 
last 15 years is disappointing if one starts from the assumption that convergence is the norm among 
market economies. Since the late 1980s, Turkey has made virtually no progress on this front. Its GDP 
per capita is now at about the same level as then, whereas other European countries have generally 
converged at least partially. 
Over this very long run, the case of Turkey cannot really be compared to the 10 current and 
prospective member countries from Central and Eastern Europe because these countries emerged from 
communist domination only about a decade ago. However, all of the 8 CEECs from the class of 2004 
have decreased the distance that separates them from the EU-15 average in terms of GDP per capita 
(both in terms of GDP at PPP and in terms of GDP at current exchange rates). Only Romania and 
Bulgaria have started to converge only very recently.  
Let us consider a scenario in which accession negotiations would start in 2005 and Turkey would 
become a member of the European Union some time between 2012 and 2015. Looking further ahead 
into the future, and taking 2025 as a year of reference, a year when Turkey would have been a EU 
member for a decade or more, and when possible transition arrangements relating to the mobility of 
labour and to agriculture would have ended, and Turkey would have become a member just like all the 8 | DERVIŞ, GROS, ÖZTRAK, BAYAR & IŞIK 
 
others, what are the prospects for relative incomes and convergence of living standards over that time 
frame? 
To understand the factors affecting growth patterns, it is useful to consider the international evidence 
based on the experience of Europe and Japan from the post-World War II years to the mid-1970s, and 
the experience of the East Asian and other middle income countries over the last decades.
4 Lower 
initial per capita income levels, demographic trends affecting the share of the working age population 
in total population, the lower initial quality of the labour force as reflected in average years of 
education, the level of savings, as well as the major role of the state in investment decisions are factors 
taken to explain the dominance of factor-input intensive growth or growth based on the mobilisation 
of production factors as compared to growth achieved primarily through increases in total factor 
productivity. 
What is the relative importance of these various factors in determining growth prospects? The 
empirical evidence so far suggests that ceteris paribus, a certain convergence can be expected 
unconditionally in the sense that if one compares two countries that differ only in their starting level of 
income per capita one would expect the poorer country to catch up over time. However, ceteris is 
almost always not paribus and this applies with particular force to Turkey, which clearly did not 
converge within the OECD club, of which it is a member. Thus, the key question is to what extent 
have the recent drastic structural changes in Turkey improved the prospects of convergence. 
The empirical literature on growth suggests that there are two classes of elements that are key for 
growth: the accumulation of factors of production and ‘institutions’. Neither of these two elements 
seems to be able to determine growth alone. It will thus be useful to analyse both briefly. 
The accumulation of factors of production can mainly take three forms: investment in physical capital, 
investment in human capital and population growth. 
Starting with the third form suggests that the demographic trends projected for Turkey may be one 
factor allowing Turkey to grow quite rapidly following the examples of the East Asian countries, 
thanks to a rising proportion of the active population in total population. Demographic trends thus put 
Turkey into a different situation when compared with the new accession countries whose demography 
makes their growth primarily dependent on total factor productivity (TFP) and foreign investment. 
Moreover, Turkey has the potential for a large-scale absorption of underemployed labour, especially 
from the rural areas and among women, into higher-productivity activities in industry and services. 
This differentiates Turkey again from the eight CEECs of the class of 2004. Only Romania shares with 
Turkey the potential of deriving substantial growth from the internal transfer of labour from low 
productivity to much higher productivity sectors. 
4.1  Investment in human capital 
In terms of Turkey’s investment in human capital, the country starts from a weak position. Table 6 
below shows the relevant data concerning both how investment in formal schooling takes place and 
the output in terms of educational achievements. It is apparent that Turkey is investing relatively little 
in education, less than most, with the exception of the poorest EU member state. Given that the share 
of the school age population is so much higher in Turkey, it is thus no consolation that Greece spends 
even less on education. In terms of educational achievements, the picture is similar: there is only one 
member that has a worse performance. It is not surprising that this is Portugal, which is showing signs 
of facing increasing difficulties in adapting to the increased competition in the internal market 
resulting from enlargement. The two new member countries for which internationally comparable data 
are available – Poland and Hungary – both invest much more in education and start from a much better 
starting point. Turkey is unique in having both a very low rate of investment in education and a bad 
starting point.  
                                                 
4 Doyle et al. (2001). RELATIVE INCOME GROWTH AND CONVERGENCE | 9  
 
Table 6. Total expenditure on education and adult population with upper secondary education 
  Total expenditure on education 
as % of GDP 
% of adult population with 
upper secondary education 
Turkey 3.91  24.3 
Poland 5.31  45.9 
Portugal 5.69  19.8 
Greece 3.86  51.4 
Hungary 5.15  70.2 
Source: OECD. 
The available data on enrolment rates and the educational attainment level of the younger generation 
indicate that the gap in terms of education is not about to be closed soon, even in the cohort that just 
entered the labour force (the 25-34 year olds) among whom less than a third has finished at least upper 
secondary education. In terms of investment in human capital, Turkey will thus face a considerable 
handicap in a ‘convergence race’ with the new member countries. 
The dual character of the Turkish economy can also be seen in the educational system. OECD data 
indicate that expenditure per student in higher (tertiary) education is more than $4,000 higher than 
GDP per capita. This is in contrast to other countries where absolute expenditure levels per student are 
lower (e.g. Poland) and always much lower if related to GDP per capita. The Turkish education 
system thus seems designed to produce a small elite that should be competitive, but does not provide 
the masses with the skills necessary for broad-based growth with an improving distribution of income. 
Table 7. Percentage of the population that has attained at least upper secondary education by age 
group 
Age group   
25-64 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 
Poland  45.9 51.7 47.5 44.5 36.4 
Portugal  19.9 32.5 19.9 13.6  8.5 
Greece  51.4 72.6 60.3 43.1 27.6 
Turkey  24.3 30.2 23.5 19.2 13.3 
Source: OECD. 
4.2  Investment in physical capital 
Until the recent crisis, the rate of investment in recent decades in physical capital has actually been 
rather high in Turkey, averaging substantially above the level of the EU-15, as shown in Figure 3. 
The fact that despite this rapid accumulation of physical capital Turkey has not converged in terms of 
GDP per capita suggests that perhaps political interference with the financial system has distorted the 
allocation of investment. One positive result of these rather high rates of capital accumulation might, 
however, have been the rather high level of productivity per worker in sectors such as industry and 
services noted above. Nevertheless, a capital-intensive model of development of this nature was 
clearly not appropriate for a country with a rapidly expanding work force; and is surprising in view of 
the high real interest rates that have prevailed over the last decade. One would have expected that 
under these circumstances the private sector should have substituted expensive capital with labour. 
This is another indication that the allocation of capital might have been distorted: capital was cheap for 
those well-connected with the political system, but not really available for the rest of the economy –
thus reinforcing the dual character of the Turkish economy. 
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Figure 3. Investment as % of GDP 
 
 
The deep restructuring of the financial system and its de-coupling from politics after the recent 
currency and banking crisis should lead in future to a more efficient allocation of capital. However, 
this crisis has also led to a slump in investment, which has only been reversed in the first quarter of 
2004. Moreover, the recovery from the crisis has so far not broken with the pattern of the past in the 
sense that so far there has been almost no increase in employment. 
One factor that might explain the capital-intensive nature of growth in Turkey over the last decades 
might be the limited flexibility of labour market institutions in the country. Surveys by the OECD of 
existing laws and regulations put Turkey consistently among the countries with the tightest labour 
market regulations. Table 8 shows that, in theory at least, labour market regulations are even more 
restrictive in Turkey than, for example, in France or Germany. Poorer countries usually have less 
restrictive labour market regulations. Turkey appears to be an outlier in this respect with an aggregate 
indicator of labour market restrictiveness not only above that of the large euro area countries 
(Germany, France and Italy), but also almost twice as high as Poland.   
Table 8. Labour market flexibility compared* 
  Version 1  Version 2 
France 3.0  2.8 
Germany 2.5  2.6 
UK 0.5  0.9 
Italy 3.3  3.4 
Poland 1.6  2.0 
Turkey 3.8  3.5 
*A higher value signifies more restrictive labour market relations. 
Source: OECD. 
Rigid labour markets may constitute a serious obstacle to growth in an economy with a rapidly 
growing work force and large regional as well as sectoral imbalances. It is important to stress, 
however, that the rigidity is more apparent than real. The existing inflexible rules reinforce the dual 
character of the economy: the official rules and regulations are (at least partially) applied in the rather 
small advanced formal sector (industry and some services), but are irrelevant for the large informal 
sector (other services and the rural part of the country). 
Labour market institutions and taxes on employment must be reformed, while fundamental ILO norms 
are maintained in the case of the former, so that the extreme dualism is overcome and that the potential 
for extensive growth from the underutilised work force can be realised. 
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A higher rate of absorption of underutilised labour requires that the additional work force be equipped 
with capital; otherwise wage rates will have to decline steeply as the capital labour ratio falls. Given 
that the working age population will continue to grow at more than 1% per annum over the next 
decade at least one condition for sustained growth without a l% fall in wages will thus be a sustained 
increase in the investment rate – both in physical and human capital. One way to illustrate this effect is 
to use the law of motion of the capital labour ratio, which states that the rate of change of the capital 
labour ratio is equal to the investment rate minus the rate growth of employment (and minus the rate of 
depreciation). 
d(ln((K/L)) = d(K)/K – d(L)/L = I/K – ∂ - d(L)/L 
where the symbol ∂ denotes the rate of depreciation and d(L)/L the rate of growth of the labour force. 
This relationship implies that in comparison with the new members from Central and Eastern Europe 
Turkey will have to have a much higher rate of capital accumulation just to keep the capital/labour 
ratio constant. How much higher? An approximate value can be calculated using some simple, but 
realistic assumptions. A good starting point might be that the depreciation rate is about 5% (e.g. 
capital depreciates over 20 years). Moreover, given the combination of much lower employment rates 
and higher growth rates of the working age population implies that it would be desirable for Turkey to 
have a rate of employment creation that is about 2% per annum higher. The investment rate required to 
keep the capital/labour ratio constant will then be about 40% (=2/5) higher in Turkey than in a country 
like Bulgaria, which has a slowly shrinking population and little surplus labour in agriculture. Since 
the capital/labour ratio is still increasing throughout the new member countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe, the difference might be somewhat smaller. But this simple calculation illustrates the 
general principle that Turkey will have to run faster just in order not to fall back. The same 
consideration also applies a fortiori to human capital formation: in order to prepare its work force to 
be competitive in the internal market, Turkey should spend more than other countries on education. 
4.3 ‘Institutions’ 
We discuss the quality of the institutions that ‘frame’ growth more in detail in a companion paper 
focusing on the stabilisation aspects of macroeconomic policies in this series (see Dervis et al., 2004). 
Here we just want to use one particular variant of the many measures of the quality of institutions that 
comes in the form of the so-called ‘overall competitiveness indicators’. Their use allows for another 
interesting comparison between Turkey and the new member and candidate countries. Turkey as a 
whole ranks above both Romania and Bulgaria in the ‘competitiveness indicators’ table prepared by 
the World Economic Forum and summarised below in Table 9. The index includes variables such as 
information society, innovation and R&D, liberalisation, network industries, financial services, 
enterprise, social inclusion and sustainable development. Besides, it should be stressed again that we 
are comparing Turkey before it has started negotiations with countries that either already are or very 
soon will be members.  
Institutions do not suddenly change overnight. Does Turkey therefore have to wait another generation 
until the institutions (the quality of the bureaucracy, the incidence of corruption, etc.) have radically 
improved? Rodrik (2004) argues that this is not necessarily the case. He shows the sustained (i.e. 
lasting more than seven years) spurts of growth often start with a minor reform – provided this reform 
eliminated the major obstacle to growth. One could argue that for Turkey the major obstacle to reform 
has been the pervasive macroeconomic instability coupled with a politicised financial system. With 
this obstacle removed and the external opening cemented through the customs union, there is thus 
reason to believe that the current growth spurt might last until the other, more slow-moving 
institutional reforms can become operative and keep the economy moving from then on. 
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Table 9. Competitiveness ranking of (potential) accession countries 
 Final  index  Sub-indexes 
Country Rank  Score  Information 
society 
Innovation 
and R&D  Liberalisation Network 
industries 
Financial 
services  Enterprise  Social 
inclusion 
Sustainable 
development 
Estonia  1  4.64  4.92  3.82 4.40  4.98 5.43 4.90 4.2  4.44 
Slovenia  2  4.36  4.38  3.92 4.06  5.21 4.69 3.76 4.24 4.60 
Latvia  3  4.34  3.62  3.86 4.44  4.35 4.84 4.87 4.47 4.29 
Malta 4  4.2  4.42  2.99 4.03  4.81 5.27 4.0  4.83 3.24 
Czech. Rep  5  4.16  3.62  3.34  4.01 5.19  4.03  4.18 4.40 4.48 
Hungary  6  4.12  3.24  3.47 4.10  4.57 4.87 4.41 4.19 4.09 
Lithuania  7  4.05  3.36  3.57 4.10  4.51 4.67 4.38 3.69 4.17 
Slovak  Rep.  8  3.89  3.29  3.34 3.84  4.50 4.39 3.43 3.83 4.53 
Poland  9  3.68  2.95  3.53 3.75  4.0  4.26 3.56 3.42 3.99 
Turkey  10  3.45  2.61  2.72 3.68  4.01 3.99 3.84 3.45 3.33 
Romania  11  3.35  2.91  2.88 3.04  3.48 3.77 3.65 3.74 3.33 
Bulgaria  12  3.25  2.66  2.94 3.26  3.54 3.64 3.81 3.07 3.06 
EU  average    4.97  4.61  4.41 4.69  5.81 5.52 4.74 4.81 5.16 
Source: World Economic Forum. 
5.  The Critical Role of Foreign Direct Investment 
If Turkey is to start a convergence process, its growth rates will have to stay around the 5-7% range 
achieved over the last few years. But experience has shown that Turkey does not generate enough 
domestic savings to finance the investment needed to keep growth at this level. This is why in the past 
growth has often been aborted when the external deficit became too large and a balance of payments 
crisis ensued. The new and prospective member countries also faced (and still face) the problem how 
to finance a huge need for new capital that cannot all be met from domestic savings. The solution in 
almost all cases has been that the current account deficit was financed by foreign direct investment 
(FDI) as FDI inflows are different from other capital inflows in that this type of capital cannot 
typically be repatriated on short notice and therefore does not lead to the potential for crises that result 
especially from short-term flows. 
Moreover, as discussed below, FDI might sometimes have a stronger productivity-enhancing effect 
than domestic investment.  
For a country with a domestic savings shortfall and a limited technological base, a high rate of FDI 
inflows would be desirable. But reality has been disappointing in view of the fact that Turkey had 
initiated a far-reaching liberalisation and structural adjustment programme in the early 1980s and has 
made a considerable effort to integrate with the global economy since then.  
The main factor that has deterred foreign investment in Turkey has been the lack of political and 
macroeconomic stability. A high degree of economic uncertainty and bureaucratic barriers confronting 
business hindered the inflow of foreign direct investment to the country. The inadequacy of these 
flows impeded the modernisation process of the capital stock and hampered access to international 
export markets; and, at the end, emerged as a major obstacle preventing Turkey from realising its 
economic potential. 
Therefore, one of the main objectives of the Economic Programme launched in 2001 has been to take 
decisive steps to improve investment and business conditions in the country. In this context, a new 
foreign direct investment law has been enacted in July 2003. The new law has been designed as an 
integral part of the ambitious structural reform programme. It aims at improving the investment 
climate by creating a more transparent marketplace fully integrated with the world supported by a 
smaller yet more effective state. In that direction, the concepts of foreign direct investment and foreign 
investors have been redefined according to international standards, and the rights of investors have RELATIVE INCOME GROWTH AND CONVERGENCE | 13  
 
been enhanced via amendments with respect to various issues such as national treatment, guarantee of 
transfers, access to real estate, international arbitration, employment of expatriates, etc. 
Besides this new law, the government has established the Coordination Committee for the 
Improvement of the Investment Climate (YOIKK). This body, composed of high-level representatives 
of relevant ministries, the private sector and NGOs, was formed to identify and remove regulatory and 
administrative barriers to investment.  
With these steps, backed by the amendments concerning the simplification and streamlining of 
company registration, Turkey has become, at least in terms of legislation, one of the countries with the 
shortest and simplest process to set up a business. Together with prospects of EU membership in less 
than 10 years this should lead to much greater FDI inflows. As seen in Table 10, FDI as a percent of 
GDP is relatively low in Turkey compared to the new members of the EU as well as Bulgaria and 
Romania. The experience of Central and Eastern European countries during the 1990s has shown that 
FDI has been an influential factor in terms of their economic restructuring and modernisation. In 
particular, by bringing capital, technology, expertise and know-how, foreign investments have been 
very effective in increasing productivity and innovation in these economies.
6 
Table 10. Foreign direct investment (% of GDP) 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 
Bulgaria  4.2 6.2 7.9 5.1 
Cyprus  0.8 1.3 1.8 1.8 
Czech Republic  6.5 11.5 9.7  8.6 
Estonia 10.9  5.8  7.6  9.7 
Hungary  4.3 4.2 3.6 4.7 
Latvia  5.9 5.2 5.7 2.3 
Lithuania  8.5 4.6 3.4 3.7 
Malta  7.7 22.6  18.1 8.5 
Poland  4.0 4.7 5.8 3.1 
Romania  4.8 2.9 2.8 3.2 
Slovakia  2.6 1.6 1.5 7.2 
Slovenia  1.1 0.5 0.7 2.6 
Turkey  0.5 0.4 0.5 2.3 
Source: Calculated from EUROSTAT data. 
With the start of accession negotiations in the near future, Turkey will thereby acquire the strong 
political anchor provided by the EU, which should contribute to a substantial increase in foreign 
investment inflows. This, in turn, while contributing to employment creation in the country, will 
further improve debt dynamics and hence will be a major achievement on Turkey’s road towards 
realising its economic potential.  
A recent survey on the determinants and growth effects of FDI emphasises that the positive spill-over 
effects of FDI become stronger only if the host environment is able to absorb advanced technology 
(see Uppenberg & Reiss, 2004). In practical terms this means a well-educated work force and at least a 
small high-productivity sector. As emphasised elsewhere, Turkey scores rather badly in terms of the 
level of qualification of its work force, but there are also sectors in the Turkish economy that are quite 
advanced in terms of technology and value-added per employee. Compared to the transition countries, 
Turkey thus starts with one handicap and one advantage. And the handicap is likely to be felt only 
after FDI inflows reach a significant level. 
Another widely recognised determinant of FDI is the overall quality of domestic governance.  For 
example, Kinoshita & Campos (2004) show that for the CEECs, variables such as external 
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liberalisation, rule of law and the quality of bureaucracy are the most potent predictors of FDI inflows. 
At present, the indicators for Turkey on the last two items are rather low as documented in the 
companion paper entitled Stabilising Stabilisation (see Dervis et al., 2004).  In technical terms, the 
values for Turkey are two standard deviations below the EU-27 average.   What would be the impact 
of bringing Turkey up to the EU-27 standard?  By using the estimates for the new member countries, 
one can arrive at an approximate answer:  The improvement in the rule of law and the quality of the 
bureaucracy should lead to an increase in FDI of about $200 per capita (in constant purchasing power 
terms) in the short run and about three times this value in the long run. This is an additional effect that 
would come on top of other improvements to the investment climate. This effect alone would mean 
that a drastic improvement in domestic governance might lead to an increase in FDI flows in the long 
run worth cumulatively, i.e. over a decade or so, about $600 per capita or close to 20% of GDP, 
leading to a total that should be on a similar scale as the inflows experienced by the new member 
countries (see Kinoskita & Campos, 2004).  
6. Convergence  Scenarios 
Over the long-term, per capita income in Turkey, when compared to EU averages, will converge or 
diverge depending on relative rates of investment, relative increases in labour inputs, relative increases 
in total factor productivity and terms of trade effects. These developments will all be reflected in 
Turkey’s per capita income in 2025 relative to the EU average. There will have been convergence in 
nominal incomes if Turkey’s per capita income growth rate in constant domestic prices, augmented by 
any real appreciation of the exchange rate relative to EU currencies, rises significantly more rapidly 
than income in the EU.
9 What would be a plausible scenario for convergence? The empirical literature 
has found that within a country, or a large common market, different regions tend to converge, ceteris 
paribus, to the average at a rate that is commonly estimated between 1 and 3% per annum. (The 
typical convergence growth equation is: growth = β*(relative level of GDP per capita at beginning of 
period) plus other factors.) This result implies that full convergence might take a generation or two, 
but since this is also the time horizon one has to consider when discussing Turkey’s integration into 
the EU it might be interesting to consider what the standard convergence equation would imply for the 
case of Turkey. Table 11 below shows the result using a convergence parameter at the higher end of 
the range found in the literature, i.e. a speed of convergence of 3% per annum. Starting with the 2004 
values already listed in Table 11 below this leads to the finding that Turkey could basically double its 
relative position before the end of the next decade, with its GDP per capita at PPP rising from about 
25% to over 50% of the EU-15 average.  
Table 11. Evolution of GDP per capita as % of EU-15, applying standard convergence equations and 
assuming fast convergence (3% per annum) 
  Czech 
Republic  Hungary Poland Romania  Slovenia Turkey 
1995  61.8 45.9 35.9 32.2 64.2 29.6 
2000  55.8 49.3 38.6 23.1 69.8 25.1 
2004  64  57.3 40.2 26.7 75.2  25 
2009  69.4 63.7 49.2 37.7 78.9 36.3 
2014  74.0 69.1 56.8 47.0 82.1 45.8 
2019  77.9 73.8 63.3 55.0 84.8 53.9 
Source: Own calculations. 
Applying the convergence equations mechanically for other new member countries as well implies of 
course that Turkey would not overtake them. For example, it would remain about level with Romania, 
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with which it shares the starting point. It is also worth noting that, under a successful convergence 
scenario, countries such as the Czech Republic or Hungary would pass the threshold of 75% of the EU 
average under which they would no longer qualify for Structural Funds. 
The implications of applying a standard convergence scenario are thus rather encouraging. 
A similar result can be obtained if one just extrapolates the recent performance of the Turkish 
economy into the future. Let us assume, for illustrative purposes at this stage, that the average rate of 
growth of Turkey’s per capita income in domestic prices will be 5% over the next two decades and 
that the Turkish Lira will appreciate by an average of 1% in real terms annually, over the same period, 
leading to a 6% growth in per capita income measured in foreign exchange. At the same time, let us 
assume that in the enlarged EU, per capita income would grow at 1.5% per annum for the next two 
decades, which is a little above the rate of growth achieved over the past decade. For the PPP adjusted 
version we assume 5.25% average growth in Turkey, as most of the appreciation of the exchange rate 
assumed will be reflected in a slowly decreasing gap between PPP and nominal income estimates.
10 
The result is presented in Table 12. 
Table 12. A medium term convergence scenario 
Nominal USD 
EU-15 average per capita income in 1997  $22,098 
EU average per capita income in 2005  $28,570 
EU average per capita income in 2025  $38,480 
 
Accession-10 per capita income in 1997  $ 4,323  Ratio to EU average:  19.6% 
Turkish per capita income in 2005  $ 4,016  Ratio to EU average:  14.1% 
Turkish per capita income in 2025  $12,829  Ratio to EU average:   33.3% 
PPP    
EU-15 average per capita income in 1997  $21,382    
EU average per capita income in 2005  $25,920    
EU average per capita income in 2025  $34,909    
Accession-10 per capita income in 1997  $ 9,409  Ratio to EU average:  44.0% 
Turkish per capita income in 2005  $ 7,733  Ratio to EU average:   29.8% 
Turkish per capita income in 2025  $21,517  Ratio to EU average:   61.6% 
*2005 forecasts based on data from International Monetary Fund, WEO Database, WEO April 2004. 
 
The projections above are illustrative, but they do reflect what could be considered a plausible 
scenario based on the following considerations. Turkey’s ‘historic’ per capita income growth rate over 
the last four decades has been close to 3%.
11 This has been achieved with a population growth rate of 
about 2% (starting higher and declining), an investment rate fluctuating between 18 and 25% and an 
average flow of direct foreign investment of less than 0.5% of GDP.  
The average over 40 years is, however, composed of two quite distinct sub-periods: one with an 
average close to 4% and another one with an average only slightly above 2%.  The first two decades 
(roughly 1960-79) constituted the period of rapid growth, but they were followed by two decades of 
stagnation in the sense that during this period (approximately 1980 to the present) Turkey failed to 
catch up with the OECD average.  This latter period was characterised by significant macroeconomic 
instability, including, in these two decades, three episodes of serious financial crisis in 1978-1980, 
1994 and 2001, and very high real interest rates acting as a brake on growth, particularly in the 1990s. 
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through the capital account. 
11 For a comprehensive comparison of Turkish growth with that of a large set of other countries, see Cline (2004, 
p. 58). 16 | DERVIŞ, GROS, ÖZTRAK, BAYAR & IŞIK 
 
All of the factors that inhibited growth should improve, especially if compared to the 1990s.  
First and foremost, there will be the new economic and political anchor from the start of EU 
membership negotiations, ensuring a consolidation of the structural and governance reforms 
undertaken in the 2001-03 period. The deep reforms of the banking system and fiscal policy should 
now allow a growth path without episodes of financial collapse and this should encourage FDI flows 
to reaching at least about 2% of GDP, as discussed above, helping to increase the investment rate in a 
sustainable way.  
Moreover, Turkey is continuing its demographic transition, which will lead to a very desirable ratio of 
the active population to the total population in the next two decades. In addition, Turkey has 
undergone over the last decade a massive opening of its economy, with exports (of goods and 
services) going from less than 14% of GDP during the early 1990s to over 28% today. Most of the 
liberalisation came through the customs union with the EU, which is analysed in more detail in a 
companion paper by Ülgen & Zahariadis (2004). These factors, acting together, could plausibly lead to 
a 5% annual per capita GDP growth rate until our reference year of 2025.  
This per capita growth rate measured in domestic terms would be augmented by a steady appreciation 
of the real exchange rate reflecting a Balassa-Samuelson effect observed in many other similar 
situations. On the basis of these considerations, a 6% average growth rate of per capita income 
measured in foreign currency appears as an optimistic but possible scenario if negotiations were to 
start, with membership achieved 7 to 10 years later, and macroeconomic and structural policies were 
to build on what was achieved in the recent past so that instability and serious crisis are avoided. 
7. Concluding  Remarks 
The analysis above suggests that a mixture of positive factors could now launch Turkey on a sustained 
convergence path. Combining demographic dynamism, structural reforms and a tight fiscal policy that 
crowds in private investment could lead to a significant convergence between Turkey’s living 
standards and European averages over the next two decades. In the medium run this will in addition 
require a concerted effort to improve the level of human capital formation, the one area in which 
Turkey clearly lags. Under an ‘optimistic scenario’, Turkey could significantly reduce the average 
income gap with the EU-25 as described above. Turkish per capita income would increase from about 
one-eighth of the EU-15 average in 2003 to about one-third in 2025 and from about a quarter in PPP 
terms to over 60%.  
We believe that these orders of magnitude are plausible central values, assuming that Turkey is 
anchored in Europe by a start of negotiations in 2005 and that there is gradual but steady progress 
towards membership, accompanied by moderate long-term private investments and some modest help 
coming from the European budget. (A companion paper of this series – see Dervis et al., 2004 – deals 
with Turkey and the European budget.) If FDI flows were to become even larger, say equal to 3 or 4% 
of GDP, as has been the case for some countries such as Ireland or Hungary, Turkish growth could be 
more rapid, approaching what has been achieved in some East Asian countries such as Korea over the 
last two decades. On the other hand, if significant policy mistakes are made by Turkish policy-makers 
on the road to accession, growth could fall significantly below what is projected in the illustration 
above. During this period Turkish policy-makers bear a particularly important responsibility.  
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